Research on linguistic biases shows that stereotypic expectancies are implicitly reflected in language and thereby subtly communicated to message recipients. We examined whether these findings extend to the use of negations (e.g., not smart instead of stupid). We hypothesized that people use more negations in descriptions of stereotype inconsistent behavior than in descriptions of stereotype consistent behavior. In three studies, participants either judged the applicability of experimentally controlled person descriptions, or spontaneously produced person descriptions themselves. Results provided support for this hypothesis. Moreover, a fourth study demonstrated that negations have communicative consequences. When a target person's behavior was described with negations, message recipients inferred that this behavior was an exception to the rule, and that it was more likely caused by situational circumstances than by dispositional factors. These findings indicate that by using negations people implicitly communicate stereotypic expectancies, and that negations play a subtle but powerful role in stereotype maintenance.
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The Negation Bias:
When Negations Signal Stereotypic Expectancies
When people describe others' behaviors they can choose different words and formulations.
For example, people can describe a person's dim comment as Harry was stupid or Harry was not smart. Which description they choose seems arbitrary at first sight. Both sentences adequately describe the event and people do not seem to give their choice of words much
thought. Yet, research shows that rather than being arbitrary, people's choice of words and language use is driven by systematic and implicit social cognitive processes. For instance, research on linguistic biases shows that people's prior expectancies and stereotypes influence their choice of words in describing others. That is, people use more abstract predicates to describe stereotype consistent behaviors than stereotype inconsistent behaviors. This biased language use not only reflects a speaker's stereotypic expectancies about a person, but, importantly, also transmits these expectancies to recipients. In this way, biased language use is one of the predominant means of stereotype maintenance at an interpersonal level (Maass, 1999; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989; Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003; Wigboldus, Semin & Spears, 2000) .
To extend our knowledge on linguistic biases, the present paper introduces the negation bias. Negation descriptions contain a negation marker such as not or no to deny the truth value of a particular proposition (e.g., Harry was not smart). We will refer to descriptions of others' behavior that include such negation markers as negations. Conversely, affirmation descriptions assert the truth value of a particular proposition and may be used to describe the same behavioral event (e.g., Harry was stupid). In the present research, we investigate whether the use of negations is influenced by people's stereotypic expectancies and whether negations are thereby able to transmit stereotypes between people. We suggest that people tend to use more negations when they describe stereotype inconsistent information The negation bias 4 than when they describe stereotype consistent information. For example, people may be inclined to say Harry was not smart, when Harry's dim comment is stereotype inconsistent with the social category to which Harry belongs (e.g., Harry is a professor). Conversely, they may be more inclined to say Harry was stupid when the behavior is stereotype consistent with the social category (e.g., Harry is a soccer hooligan). Moreover, we expected that this biased use of negations and affirmations results in stereotype confirming inferences among recipients of these communications, thereby contributing to stereotype maintenance at the interpersonal level.
In the following, we first review prior research on linguistic biases. Next, we examine existing knowledge about negations from pragmatics and psycholinguistics. Subsequently, we unfold further our argument about the occurrence and consequences of a negation bias.
Linguistic Biases
Research on linguistic biases shows that the words used to describe others' behaviors subtly reflect people's stereotypic expectancies about others. People systematically vary their language use in communications about stereotype inconsistent and stereotype consistent information. The linguistic intergroup and expectancy bias, for example, shows that people tend to use more concrete, descriptive language when describing behavior that violates stereotypic expectancies, whereas they use more abstract language when the same behavior is consistent with stereotypic expectancies (i.e., Maass et al., 1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000) .
Thus, when describing a man demonstrating behavior which is inconsistent with the male stereotype (e.g., crying), people use relatively concrete language (e.g., he has tears in his eyes). In contrast, when describing a woman demonstrating the same behavior, people tend to use more abstract language to describe this stereotype consistent event (e.g., she is emotional; Wigboldus et al., 2000) . Similarly, the stereotypic explanatory bias shows that descriptions of stereotype inconsistent behavior tend to contain more explanations aimed at clarifying the The negation bias 5 apparent inconsistency than descriptions of stereotype consistent behavior (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003) . Underlining the powerful role these linguistic biases play in stereotype maintenance, research shows that they operate outside of people's awareness and are related to implicit measures of prejudice (e.g., von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997) .
The significance of these linguistic biases in descriptions of others lies in the fact that they implicitly communicate stereotypes to message recipients. The linguistic intergroup and expectancy bias, for example, causes recipients to draw inferences from descriptions that are consistent with the stereotypic expectancies of the communicator (Maass et al., 1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000) . The relatively concrete language use in stereotype inconsistent messages causes recipients to infer that the behavior is unexpected, is an exception to the rule, and that it is more likely caused by situational circumstances than by dispositional factors. In contrast, the more abstract language use in stereotype consistent messages implies that the behavior is expected and that it is more likely caused by the actor's dispositional characteristics than by situational circumstances. Thus, by means of subtle variations in language abstraction use, people implicitly transmit their stereotypic expectancies to recipients, with the effect that the stereotype is shared and maintained interpersonally (Franco & Maass, 1996; Wigboldus et al. 2000) .
Existing research on linguistic biases reflecting stereotypic expectancies has not addressed the role of negations. In the current paper we aim to fill this gap and introduce the negation bias. The negation bias is conceptualized as people's tendency to use negations when communicating stereotype inconsistent information about others. Specifically, we expect that people use more negations when they communicate stereotype inconsistent information than when they communicate stereotype consistent information. Moreover, we hypothesize that recipients are sensitive to this biased use of negations by communicators, in that they will make biased attributions based on this information. In this way, the negation The negation bias 6 bias may contribute to the interpersonal maintenance and transmission of stereotypes. Our expectations are fueled by earlier work on negations that is described in following.
Negations
Philosophers, logicians, psychologists, and linguists have studied negations in language use extensively (for an overview see Horn, 1989) . A central issue they aimed to explain is when and why people use a negation rather than an affirmation to communicate information. According to Jordan (1998) the commonly held view is that negations (e.g., not drunk) are equivalent in meaning to their semantic opposites (e.g., sober). Jordan, in contrast, argued that negations are different, in that negations are more likely to be used in denying something previously stated or implying the contrary. In a pragmatics study he provided illustrations from natural written and spoken language to back up this claim. For example, signs in public areas typically use negations to signal exceptions. To illustrate, a no-exit sign on a door acknowledges that people expect to be able to leave an area via any door. Similarly, a no-smoking sign is used when the expected norm is that smoking is generally allowed. This suggests that negations are meaningful in that they deny what people expect to be the general rule.
The relation between expectations and negation use also follows from the use of expressions in communicating quantities (Moxey & Sanford, 2000) . A statement like not many people go to the cinema implies that someone might have expected that many people would go to the cinema, and subsequently denies that this was the case. The negation not many suggests either that the speaker expected that many people would go, or that the speaker believed the listener expected that many people would go. Thus, one function of negations seems to be that they indicate something that is different, unusual, or contrary to an existing expectancy (Jordan, 1998) .
The negation bias 7
Experimental studies into negations have focused mainly on how negated concepts are processed and comprehended rather than on when they are used. Importantly, also these studies suggest that negations are relatively more appropriate in communications about expectancy inconsistent information than expectancy consistent information. That is, sentences containing a negation typically take more time to process and comprehend than affirming sentences (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Gough, 1965; Deutsch, Gawronski, Strack, 2006) . Interestingly, however, this difference in processing time seems to disappear when negations are used in an appropriate context (Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; Wason, 1965) . One appropriate context (a so called context of plausible denial; Wason, 1965) is one in which an expectation needs to be denied or to be noted. For example, the negation the train was not late this morning is more plausible when the train is normally late than when it is normally punctual. Thus, negations seem to be more plausible, and thereby more easy to process and comprehend, in contexts in which they denote information that is inconsistent with people's expectations.
Further support for this assumption is provided by a developmental study (De Villiers & Flusberg, 1975) . In this study, children of age 2 to 4 watched displays of seven similar objects (e.g., toy cars) and one dissimilar object (e.g., a baby bottle). The experimenter pointed to an object and prompted children with affirmations (i.e., This is a…) and negations (i.e., This is not a…). The children's task was to respond with the name of the object. The dependent variables consisted of the time taken to name the object and the error rate. Results showed that when the experimenter pointed to one of the seven similar objects, the children responded faster to the affirmation prompt than to the negation prompt. However, when the experimenter pointed to the dissimilar object, the children responded equally fast to the affirmation and negation prompts. Apparently, the processing of negations is facilitated when they are used to communicate unexpected or unusual information.
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Taken together, research on negations suggests that that they are more appropriate and easier to comprehend in communications about expectancy inconsistent information.
Extending these findings to the communication of stereotypes, we propose that the use of negations in describing other people is driven by existing stereotypic expectancies, resulting in the negation bias.
The Negation Bias
Why should the use of negations change as a function of stereotypic expectancies? We know from the stereotype literature that, upon perceiving (or reading about) the behavior of an actor, people automatically activate the mental representations associated with the person or the social category to which the person belongs (Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2003) . For example, the category label professor activates stereotype consistent trait terms such as smart and inhibits stereotype inconsistent trait terms such as stupid (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1996) . One result of this is that the activation of a social category should make the use of terms that are stereotype consistent with this category more probable in descriptions of category members. In a similar vein, because of the decreased accessibility of stereotype inconsistent terms, their use will be less likely in these descriptions.
Taken together, this should result in an increased likelihood of negation use when the person's behavior is stereotype inconsistent. To get back to our previous example, when describing a person who made an awkwardly dim comment, one might be inclined to use the term stupid. However, the prior knowledge that this person is a professor will make stereotype consistent terms, such as smart, temporary more accessible, and stereotype inconsistent terms, such as stupid, temporary less accessible. Due to these differences in accessibility, the description of the dim behavior of a professor is relatively likely to contain a negation (i.e.,
She is not smart).
Conversely, when describing a person who made a very clever comment, The negation bias 9 one might be inclined to use the term smart. Yet, the prior knowledge that this person is a soccer hooligan will render the concept stupid more accessible (and the term smart less accessible) and as a result lead to a description containing a negation (i.e., not stupid rather than smart).
Importantly, the stereotypically biased use of negations may be an important source of bias by which people subtly reveal and communicate their stereotypic expectancies. By choosing a negation instead of an affirmative antonym, people introduce stereotype consistent information to the discourse. To illustrate, when stating that Harry's dim comment was not smart, one introduces the meaning of the negated item (i.e., smart) and the presupposition that Harry was expected to be smart, which is denied. Moreover, by introducing information via a negation, people convey a mitigated, more neutral version of the described event (see . To illustrate, not smart introduces a positive concept to describe Harry's dim comment, and consequently conveys a less negative impression of Harry's behavior than stating that Harry's comment was stupid. Likewise, not stupid conveys a less positive impression than smart, because it introduces a negative concept. Thus, when negations are used, a less extreme, more neutral meaning is conveyed.
With respect to the communicative consequences, we expect the proposed biased use of negations (e.g., to describe negative behavior of a professor as 'not smart' rather than 'stupid') to go together with a stereotype confirming pattern of inferences in recipients. First, when negations rather than affirmations are used, we expect message recipients to develop a less extreme impression of the actor's behavior (i.e., less negative in the case of 'not smart').
Second, we expect recipients to infer that the communicators' prior expectancy is opposite to the described behavior (i.e., he/she expected 'smart' behavior). Moreover, we expect recipients to attribute the information in messages containing a negation relatively less to stable dispositional factors of the actor and more to situational factors. This pattern of The negation bias 10 inferences is stereotype confirming, because it maintains the stereotypic view about the described actor (i.e., professors are smart).
In summary, in the present work we aim to apply what pragmatics and linguistics teach us about negations to linguistic biases and stereotype maintenance. We investigated whether the use of negations is driven by stereotypic expectancies and whether the use of negations results in a stereotype confirming pattern of inferences in message recipients. We hypothesize that when people describe stereotype inconsistent behavior of an actor, they will be more likely to use negations than when they describe stereotype consistent behavior. The first three experiments aimed to test this hypothesis, using different methods and experimental designs.
The fourth experiment examined the communicative consequences of the use of negations among recipients. We will further underpin our hypotheses regarding these communicative consequences in the introduction of Study 4.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed as an initial test of our hypothesis that the use of negations in describing an actor's behavior increases when the behavior is stereotype inconsistent. Participants were presented a series of sentence pairs describing an actor's behavior. Each sentence in a pair described the same actor and behavior and had the same structure, except that one sentence contained a negated adjective (e.g., not neat) and the other an affirmative antonym (e.g., messy). Participants indicated which sentence in each pair gave a more common description in their language (see also Giora, Balaban, Fein & Alkabets, 2005, Exp. 2) . In half of the sentence pairs the behavior of the actor was stereotype inconsistent; in the other half it was stereotype consistent. In addition, even though our hypotheses are independent of valence, in our design we controlled for the factor valence of the actor's behavior. We predicted that participants would show a relatively greater preference for the sentences containing a The negation bias 11 negation when the behavior was stereotype inconsistent than when it was consistent, and that this effect would be independent of valence of the behavior. 
Method

Participants and design
Thirty
Procedure
Upon arrival to the lab participants were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer and told that all instructions would be presented on the computer screen. They read that this was a study on choice of words, and that they would be presented with sentence pairs of two sentences describing the same situation. We explained that the sentences were not meant to be ironic or funny but would simply describe people and their behavior. The words in the two sentences would have more or less the same meaning, and would be correct descriptions of the same situation, but the choice of words would be different. It was their task to indicate which of two sentences presented in a pair felt most natural to them. They were The negation bias 12 told not to think too long about their answer and to answer spontaneously. Next, the sentence pairs were presented. Depending on the position condition, for half of the participants the negation was presented in the top box on screen and the affirmation description in the box below, for the other half of participants this presentation was reversed. Participants could indicate their answer by clicking on the box showing the sentence they preferred. After finishing the task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Sentence stimuli
To manipulate stereotype consistency of the actor's behavior we developed five sets of stimuli that were used to create the sentences. Each set consisted of two actors and two adjectives that were antonyms. One of the adjectives in each set was stereotype consistent with actor one, but stereotype inconsistent with actor two, while the second adjective was stereotype inconsistent with actor one, but consistent with actor two. For example, one set consisted of the two actors rock musician and cleaner and the two adjectives messy and neat.
Messy was considered to be stereotype consistent with rock musician, but inconsistent with cleaner, whereas neat was stereotype consistent with cleaner, but inconsistent with rock musician. Each set allowed us to create four pairs of sentences in which one sentence contained a negation and the other one an affirmation, while keeping the structure and content constant across conditions. In each set, two sentence pairs described positive behavior and two negative behavior and two were stereotype inconsistent and two stereotype consistent. To illustrate, based on the set cleaner and rock musician and neat and messy, we created one The other sentence sets that were used to manipulate stereotype consistency and valence were: The journalist did (not) describe Hitler (Ghandi) as a warlike (peaceful) leader;
That brilliant (dull) student did (not) write a good (bad) thesis; My grandpa (little sister) thought he /she was (not) old (young); The woman at the funeral (wedding party) looked (did not look) happy (sad). 1 The presentation order was such that a sentence pair from Set 1 was followed by a sentence pair from Set 2 until Set 5, and then starting again with a sentence pair from Set 1, Set 2 and so forth until all 20 sentence pairs had been presented.
Results
Of the 1.25). We observed no main effect for valence (F < 1), nor an interaction effect (F (1, 30) = 2.60, p = .12, η p 2 = .08).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that people's preference for negations over affirmations increases when stereotype inconsistent behavior is communicated.
Participants were significantly more likely to opt for a sentence formulation containing a negation when the behavior of the actor was stereotype inconsistent than when it was stereotype consistent. Thus, although people generally prefer affirmation formulations over negations (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Gough, 1965) , in the case of descriptions of stereotype inconsistent behavior, participants indicated a relative preference for negations.
The forced choice method used in Study 1 allowed us to compare preferences for two distinct sentence formulations (affirmation vs. negation) of otherwise identical sentences. At the same time, it prevented us from obtaining information about the extent to which people prefer negations and affirmations to describe stereotype inconsistent and consistent behavior.
Moreover, it did not allow us to test our prediction that perceived stereotype inconsistency causes the relative increase in preferences for negations. We conducted Study 2 to address these questions.
Study 2
Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1 using a different method and stimulus material and to circumvent the shortcomings of the forced choice task. To this end, participants read sentences describing an actor's stereotype consistent and inconsistent behavior (e.g., The nurse shouts at the waiter). Each sentence was succeeded by two different descriptions of the behavior, one including a negation (e.g., She is not nice) and one containing the affirmative antonym (e.g., She is rude). Participants judged the applicability of each of these descriptions.
To manipulate stereotype consistency, we varied the social category to which the actor
The negation bias 15
belonged (e.g., nurse, soccer hooligan). The behavior in the descriptions was either stereotype consistent or stereotype inconsistent with these categories.
This method allowed us to test whether participants judge negation descriptions as more applicable when the behavior is stereotype inconsistent than when the behavior is stereotype consistent. In addition, we measured the extent to which participants perceived the behaviors as stereotype inconsistent, which allowed us to test whether stereotype consistency is predictive of the judged applicability of negation descriptions.
Method Participants and design
Thirty-six Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (22 women, 14 men, mean age 21.3 years) participated in this, and an unrelated study, and received € 2.50 for their participation of about 20 minutes. Participants read 24 sentences, half of which described an actor performing stereotype consistent behavior and half described an actor performing stereotype inconsistent behavior. Each sentence was followed by two descriptions: one negation and one affirmation. Participants judged the applicability of each description in describing the behavior in the sentence. The study consisted of a 2 (stereotype consistency of behavior: consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2 (description type: negation vs. affirmation) within participants design.
Procedure
Participants were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer and were told that all instructions would be presented on the computer screen. They read that this was a study on behavior descriptions, and that they would be presented with sentences describing a person's behavior followed by two possible descriptions describing the behavior in the sentence. They were asked to indicate how applicable they found each description for the behavior in the sentence. Subsequently, the sentences were presented (e.g., The professor scored high on an
The negation bias 16 IQ test), followed by two possible descriptions in succession: a negation description (e.g., He
is not stupid) and an affirmation description (e.g., He is smart). For each description participants indicated how applicable they found the description, by clicking a box on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all applicable, to 7 = very applicable. The behavior in the sentences (e.g., scored high / low on an IQ test) was either stereotype consistent or inconsistent for the actor (e.g., professor vs. garbage man). See below and Appendix A for all stimuli and presentation order. After judging the descriptions, the sentences were presented once more and participants indicated how unexpected they found the behavior in each sentence on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = not at all unexpected, to 7 = very unexpected.
Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Stimuli
For this study, we developed six new sets of actors and behaviors that allowed us to create stereotype consistent and inconsistent sentences, while keeping the content constant across the different conditions (a -f, see Appendix A). Similar to Study 1, each set consisted of two actors (e.g., professor / garbage man) and two behaviors (e.g., scored high / low on the IQ test: partly based on Wigboldus, et al., 2003 sentences, half of which were stereotype consistent and half were stereotype inconsistent.
Each sentence was associated with two descriptions (one negation, one affirmation). Note that in this design, actors, behaviors, and the judged descriptions were exactly the same across the stereotype consistent and inconsistent conditions.
As can be seen in Appendix A, the order of the sentences was such that a random sentence from set (a) was followed by a random sentence from set (b), and so forth till set (f), and again starting with a remaining sentence from set (a). In this way the different actor and behavior combinations from the different sets were presented in a mixed random order.
Results
Applicability of behavior descriptions
To test our hypothesis that negation descriptions were perceived as relatively more 
Unexpectedness of behavior in sentence
We conducted a paired t-test on the mean ratings of how unexpected the stereotype consistent and inconsistent sentences were. The test confirmed that participants rated stereotype inconsistent sentences as significantly more unexpected (M = 5.23, SD = 0.63) than stereotype consistent sentences (M = 2.67, SD = 0.87), t (35) = 12.29, p < .01, r = .86, confirming that our manipulation was successful.
Our hypothesis stated that the more unexpected a behavior is, the more likely it will be described using a negation (e.g., not stupid) than an affirmative antonym (e.g., smart). To analyze whether this was the case, we used a method developed to estimate mediation and moderation effects in within-participant designs (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001 Second, the unexpectedness difference must predict the difference in relative applicability score. This was the case, β = .37, t (33) = 2.18, p = .04. According to Judd et al. (2001) , if the sum score of unexpectedness had predicted the difference score on relative applicability of descriptions, this would reflect a moderation model. This was not the case, β = -.07, t < 1, p = .66. Furthermore, after centering the sum score of unexpectedness (by subtracting the mean) the same model was estimated again. The intercept in this model was not found to differ significantly from zero, t < 1, p = .69, which indicates that there is no residual effect of stereotype consistency condition over and above the mediated effect (Judd et al., 2001) .
Taken together, these analyses provide evidence for full mediation of the effect of stereotype consistency on the relative applicability of negation vs. affirmation descriptions by perceived unexpectedness (Judd et al., 2001 ).
Discussion
The findings of Study 2 again corroborate the existence of a negation bias. In line with the results of Study 1, negation descriptions were rated as more applicable when they described stereotype inconsistent behavior than when they described stereotype consistent
The negation bias 20 behavior. Specifically, the same behavior (e.g., shouting at the waiter) was more likely described with a negation (e.g., not nice) when the actor was not expected to show this behavior (e.g., a nurse) than when the actor was expected to show this behavior (e.g., a soccer hooligan).
Moreover, mediation analysis demonstrated that it was the perceived unexpectedness of the behavior in a sentence that mediated the rated applicability of negation (vs. affirmation)
descriptions. These results provide clear evidence for our notion that when stereotypic expectancies are violated, the use of negations in person descriptions becomes more likely.
Nonetheless, given that the methods of Study 1 and 2 relied on sentence stimuli created by us, an important question that remains unanswered is whether people spontaneously produce the negation bias when they are free to formulate their own person descriptions. Study 3 aimed to increase the external validity of the findings of the first two studies by using spontaneous person descriptions. We expected participants to spontaneously use more negations in free descriptions of people showing stereotype inconsistent behavior than in descriptions of people showing stereotype consistent behavior.
Study 3
Study 3 used gender stereotypes to examine the effect of stereotypic expectations on the use of negations. It was tested whether people spontaneously use more negations when describing gender stereotype inconsistent behavior than gender stereotype consistent behavior. To prevent the confounding influence of semantic priming effects, we manipulated stereotype consistency in a non-semantic way. We combined photos of two persons (one male and one female) and two sports (one stereotypically male, one stereotypically female). Participants freely described their impression of the person who ostensibly engaged in one of the sports.
Method Participants and design
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Sixty-five Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (42 women, 23 men, M age = 21 years) participated in this, and other unrelated studies, and received € 5,-for their participation of about 40 minutes. They were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 2 (gender stereotype consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) X 2 (described person:
woman vs. man) between participants design.
Procedure
Participants were seated in individual cubicles and were told that all instructions would be presented on the computer screen. They read that in this study we were gathering descriptions of different sports and the people who practice them, and that they would be shown a photo of a specific sport and of a person who practices this sport. They were asked to take their time to describe their impression of the sport and the person. Depending on condition, the next screen showed on the left an action photo of people performing either the stereotypically female sport of jazz ballet or the stereotypically male sport of rugby. On the right, a photo of either a woman or a man was shown, who we said was someone who practiced this sport. In the stereotype consistent conditions the jazz ballet photo was combined with the photo of the woman and the rugby photo with the photo of the man. The converse was true for the stereotype inconsistent conditions.
Below the pictures was a box in which participants could type their descriptions. To activate the stereotype, we first asked participants to describe what they found typical of the sport and the people who practice it. In the same box, participants subsequently were asked to describe their impression of the man or the woman in the photo and how they expected him/her to behave when practicing the sport. The dependent variable consisted of the number of negations used in the descriptions of the person, which was obtained by counting occurrences of not or no (Dutch: niet, geen) in the text describing the person. We also registered the time and the number of words participants used for their description. 
Manipulation check
Participants agreed with the notion that rugby is a stereotypically male sport (M = 6.32, SD = 0.92) and jazz ballet a stereotypically female sport (M = 5.15, SD = 1.86). Both the mean rating for rugby and jazz ballet were significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 3.5, t (64) = 24.73, p < .01, r = .95, for rugby; t (64) = 7.18, p < .01, r = .67, for jazz ballet, respectively.
Use of negations
Before analyzing our main hypothesis regarding the number of negations used, we checked whether there were any systematic differences in writing time or length of descriptions between conditions. The analyses of variance did not yield effects for writing time (all Fs < 1.1; overall M = 5.44 minutes, SD = 2.92) or the number of words used to describe the person (all F's < 1; overall M = 69 words, SD = 38).
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We hypothesized that participants would use more negations when describing a person in a stereotype inconsistent situation than when describing the same person in a stereotype consistent situation. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an analysis of variance on the number of negations that were used in descriptions of the person. Consistent with our prediction the analysis yielded a significant main effect of stereotype consistency, F ( 
Unexpectedness of behavior
The analysis on unexpectedness revealed a large main effect of gender stereotype consistency, F (1, 61) = 136.17, p < .01, η p 2 = .69, showing that the behavior of a person (man or woman) practicing a gender stereotype inconsistent sport (i.e., jazz ballet or rugby) was rated as significantly more unexpected (M = 6.10, SD = 0.82) than the behavior of a person practicing a gender stereotype consistent sport (M = 3.10, SD = 1.18). We observed no significant main effect of described person, F < 1, nor an interaction effect, F (1, 61) = 2.40, p = .13 in this analysis.
In addition, we found that the number of negations used in describing the person was significantly correlated with these judgments of unexpectedness, r (65) = .35, p < .01. This finding is in line with the idea that negation use is augmented with increasing perceived unexpectedness of the described person's behavior. 2 
Discussion
The findings of our third study again support our predictions regarding the negation bias. Participants spontaneously used more negations when the person engaged in stereotype inconsistent behavior than when the same person engaged in stereotype consistent behavior.
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Importantly, replicating Study 2, the perceived unexpectedness of the behavior again was related to the use of negations. This affirms our suggestion that negation use reflects stereotype inconsistency: The more participants perceived a behavior to be stereotype inconsistent, the more they spontaneously used negations. Taken together, the results of our first three studies suggest that negations are an important source of bias by which people reveal stereotypic expectancies in their communications. The question whether this biased use of negations influences inferences made by recipients of these communications was examined in Study 4.
Study 4
In line with other linguistic biases (see Franco & Maass, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007) , we like to suggest that the use of negations subtly communicates stereotypic expectancies to recipients and consequently contributes to stereotype maintenance at an interpersonal level. Study 4 sought to examine three questions regarding the communicative consequences of the negation bias that have remained unanswered by our previous studies.
A first question is whether negation descriptions (e.g., Harry was not smart) communicate a different impression of the described person than affirmation descriptions (e.g., Harry was stupid). Research in psycholinguistics examined how message recipients process negated concepts. An ongoing debate is whether information introduced via negations (e.g., the concept 'smart' in 'not smart') remains accessible, or instead, is suppressed and replaced by an available antonym (i.e., stupid). One view is that a negation signals a speaker's instruction to suppress the negated information and eliminates it from the mental representation (e.g., Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, 2001; MacDonald & Just, 1989) . In this case, the meaning communicated by not smart will indeed be equivalent to stupid. In contrast, Giora and colleagues argue that the information introduced via negations is more likely to remain accessible than to be suppressed (Giora, 2007; Giora, Balaban et al., 2005;  The negation bias 25 . Supporting their suggestions, several studies showed that rather than discarding the negated concept from the mental representation, a negation marker mitigates this information. For example, in one study (Giora, Balaban, et al., 2005 (Giora, 2007; Giora, Balaban, et al., 2005; Giora, Fein, Aschkenazi, & Alkabets-Zlozover, 2007) .
The ironic consequence is that, when negations are used, the meaning of the negated concept is introduced to the discourse, and the exact opposite of the message content is made more accessible in recipients. This is in line with previous research on persuasion demonstrating that persuasive attempts containing a negation (e.g., Drinking is not sexy) can lead to attitude change opposite of what was intended (i.e., make drinking seem sexy; Christie et al., 2001; Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal, 2004) . Similarly, recipients may remember the opposite of the intended meaning (i.e., John is guilty) when they heard a negation (i.e., John was not guilty; Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004) . Thus, research suggests that negations make associations with the negated concept more accessible. Consequently, rather than suppressing the associations that a speaker denies, negations may reinforce these associations in a recipient.
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Extending these suggestions to the negation bias, we predicted that negation descriptions communicate a more neutral impression of the described person than affirmation descriptions. Specifically, we hypothesized that when a positive performance of a person is described with a negation (e.g., not stupid), the communicated impression is more negative than when it is described with an affirmation (e.g., smart). That is, in this case, the negation makes a negative concept (e.g., stupid) temporarily more accessible. If the use of the negation resulted from a negative stereotypic expectancy of the speaker, as our previous studies suggest, this expectancy is thus reinforced in a more negative impression in recipients.
Conversely, when a negative performance is described with a negation (e.g., not smart) compared to an affirmation (e.g., stupid), we expected that the communicated impression is more positive. This could reinforce a positive stereotypic expectancy of a speaker in recipients. These suggestions are in line with the notion that negations are mitigations that downplay both positive and negative information .
A second question is whether recipients draw inferences about a speaker's prior expectancies when he or she uses a negation to describe someone's behavior. Previous research has demonstrated that bias in language use can be diagnostic of the speaker's expectancies (Douglas & Sutton, 2006) . If the use of negations results from a speaker's positive or negative prior expectancies, it seems likely that recipients use these negations to form impressions about the speaker. In line with the negation bias, we predicted that the use of negations indicate to recipients that the speaker has an expectancy that is opposite to what is being described. For example, when a speaker describes a target's positive performance as "not bad," recipients should infer that the speaker had a more negative prior expectancy about the target than when the speaker describes the performance as "good."
The third question is whether negation descriptions induce differences in dispositional and situational attributions based on the described person's behavior. This question follows
The negation bias 27 directly from effects of other linguistic biases that contribute to stereotype maintenance at an interpersonal level. Research on the linguistic intergroup and expectancy bias (Maass et al., 1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000) demonstrated that stereotype inconsistent descriptions induce weaker dispositional inferences and stronger situational inferences by recipients than stereotype consistent descriptions. Specifically, the relatively concrete language use in the case of stereotype inconsistent messages causes recipients to infer that the behavior was an exception to the rule and was more likely caused by situational circumstances than by dispositional factors. In contrast, the more abstract formulations of stereotype consistent messages imply that the behavior was expected and reflects a stable underlying characteristic of the actor (for an overview see Maass & Arcuri, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007) .
Extending these findings to the negation bias, we predicted that the negation bias will result in a stereotype confirming pattern of situational and dispositional attributions of the described behavior among recipients. If a behavior is described with a negation we predicted that recipients infer that the behavior was unexpected and different from what the speaker presumed. Consequently, recipients should be less likely to attribute this particular behavior to stable underlying characteristics of the actor, and more likely to attribute it to temporal situational circumstances. Negation descriptions (e.g., he was not smart) should thus induce weaker dispositional and stronger situational attributions than affirmation descriptions of the same behavior (e.g., he was stupid).
Study 4 was designed to examine these three questions regarding the communicative consequences of the negation bias. Participants were presented with a number of written situations in which a speaker described the behavior of another person. For each person description, containing either negation or affirmation, participants were asked to rate (1) their impression of the described person, (2) their impression about the speaker's prior expectancies, and (3) their attributions about the described behavior.
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Method
Participants and design
Twenty-nine Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (23 women, 6
men, mean age 20.4 years) participated in this paper-and-pencil study, and an unrelated study, and received € 2.50 for their participation of about 20 minutes. In separate cubicles, they filled out a questionnaire presenting situations in which a speaker described the behavior of a target person. The descriptions varied according to the conditions of a 2 (description type: affirmation vs. negation) X 2 (valence of described behavior: positive vs. negative) within participants design.
Questionnaire
Participants read that we were interested in the things people infer from descriptions of behavior, and that they would be presented with a number of situations in which a person described a behavior or performance of another person. They were instructed to read the different descriptions carefully, and to answer the questions for each description separately. It was stressed that there were no wrong answers and that we were interested in their opinion.
Next, participants received brief written situations in which a speaker described the behavior of another person (target). Each behavior description was introduced by a brief introduction like: "A coach has just watched his athlete Peter running a race. The coach describes Peter…" This was followed by one of the descriptions (see Appendix B) that, depending on the condition, either contained an affirmation or negation, and described either positive or negative behavior. We introduced three different speakers describing three targets.
Each speaker returned four times with a different behavior description of the same target. The speakers and targets were (1) a teacher describing the behavior of a student who had made an assignment, (2) a woman describing the behavior of her brother who helped her in organizing a celebration, and (3) a sports coach describing the performance of his athlete in a race. The
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The order was such that a random description from the first speaker-target situation (i.e., teacher-student) was always followed by a random description from the second (i.e., womanbrother) and subsequently the third (i.e., coach-athlete), and again starting with a remaining description from the first speaker-target situation and so forth. In this way, the presentation order of the different descriptions belonging to these three speaker-target situations was randomly mixed.
Dependent variables
Participants answered the following questions for each behavior description. Please note that the items contain the words speaker and target between brackets. Depending on the speaker-target situation, participants either read teacher / woman / coach in the position of speaker, and student / brother / athlete in the position of target.
To measure impression we asked: How negative or positive is (speaker) about (target) in this specific situation? Participants answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = negative to 7 = positive.
To measure inferred negative and positive prior expectancy we used two items that we To what extent is this behavior due to the situation or the person (scale: -3 = situation to 3 = person). These three items were combined into one scale (Cronbach's α = .83), after reverse coding the second item and recoding the third item, such that 1 = situational attribution, 7 = dispositional attribution (see also Wigboldus et al., 2000) . As an additional measure of dispositional inference, we assessed repetition likelihood (see also Wigboldus et al., 2000; Maass et al., 1989) . Participants indicated the chance with which the target would be likely to repeat the behavior in the future (in percentage 1-100 %).
Results
For each dependent variable we computed the mean scores across the three speakertarget situations for the four types of behavior descriptions. These were analyzed with 2 (description type: affirmation vs. negation) X 2 (valence of described behavior: positive vs.
negative) ANOVAs with repeated measures on both factors.
Communicated impression
Not surprisingly, the analysis on the rated impression of the described person resulted in a main effect of valence of described behavior, F (1, 28) = 562.99, p < .01, η p 2 = .95. As can be seen in Table 1 , participants inferred that the speaker was more positive about the target for descriptions of positive behavior (M = 5.56, SE = 0.10) than descriptions of negative behavior (M = 2.16, SE = 0.10). We also observed a main effect of description type, F (1, 28) = 15.37, p < .01, η p 2 = .35, showing that with affirmation descriptions (M = 4.08, SE = 0.05) participants inferred that the speaker was more positive about the target than with negation descriptions (M = 3.64, SE = 0.11). In line with our hypothesis, a significant interaction
The negation bias 31 between valence of described behavior and description type was obtained, F (1, 28) = 89.02, p < .01, η p 2 = .76. For descriptions of positive behavior, participants judged the speaker to be less positive about the target when a negation described the behavior than when an affirmation described the behavior. For descriptions of negative behavior, the opposite pattern was observed; participants judged the speaker to be more positive about the target when a negation described the behavior than when an affirmation described it (see Table 1 ). These findings are consistent with our suggestion that negations convey the meaning associated with the negated concept and consequently leave a mitigated, more neutral impression on the recipient.
Inferred prior expectancies
Consistent with the idea that bias in language use can be diagnostic about the speaker's expectancies (Douglas & Sutton, 2006) , we expected recipients to form speaker impressions on the basis of negation use. Specifically, we expected recipients to infer that a speaker had an a priori negative expectancy when he or she uses a negation rather than affirmation to describe a positive performance (e.g., not bad). Conversely, we expected recipients to infer that a speaker had an a priori positive expectancy when he or she uses a negation to describe a negative performance (e.g., not good). The analysis on the extent to which participants inferred a negative expectancy yielded a marginal main effect of valence of described behavior, F (1, 28) = 4.03, p < .06, η p 2 = .13. Participants tended to infer that the speaker was a priori somewhat more negative about the target for descriptions of positive behavior (M = 3.72, SE = 0.17) than for descriptions of negative behavior (M = 3.20, SE = 0.16). We also observed a main effect of description type, F (1, 28) = 36.58, p < .01, η p 2 = .57,
showing that participants inferred that the speaker had a more negative expectancy when negation descriptions were used (M = 3.85, SE = 0.13) than when affirmations were used (M = 3.07, SE = 0.11). Consistent with our hypothesis a significant interaction was found
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.67. For descriptions of positive behavior participants inferred a stronger negative expectancy when negations were used than when affirmations were used. For descriptions of negative behavior, however, we observed the opposite; participants inferred a less negative expectancy when negations were used than when affirmations were used (see Table 1 ).
We observed a similar pattern of results in the analysis on the extent to which participants inferred a positive expectancy. A significant main effect of valence of described were used than when negations were used. In contrast, for descriptions of negative behavior, participants inferred a more positive expectancy in the speaker when negations were used than when affirmations were used (see Table 1 ).
Taken together, these findings are in line with our suggestion that the use of negations indicate to recipients that the speaker has an opposite expectancy to what is being described.
When a speaker used negations to describe a positive performance (i.e., not bad, not stupid, not annoying), recipients inferred that the speaker had a more negative (and a less positive) a priori expectancy than when the speaker used affirmations (i.e., good, smart, sweet).
Similarly, when a speaker used negations to describe a negative performance (i.e., not good,
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Dispositional inferences
With respect to dispositional inferences we expected recipients to draw weaker dispositional attributions, and stronger situational attributions, from negation descriptions than from affirmation descriptions. The analysis on our measure of dispositional (versus situational) inferences revealed a significant main effect of valence of described behavior, F negations were used than when affirmations were used. For descriptions of negative behavior the difference was in the expected direction but was only marginally significant (see Table 1 ).
The analysis on our other measure of dispositional inference, the repetition likelihood, 24. However, on this measure we observed a significant difference between negation and affirmation descriptions both when describing positive and negative behavior.
As predicted, the estimated repetition likelihood was significantly higher for affirmation descriptions than for negation descriptions (see Table 1 ).
Discussion
Taken together, the results of Study 4 demonstrate that the use of negations has communicative consequences in that it biases the inferences recipients draw about both the speaker and the target of the descriptions. When negations (e.g., not bad, not stupid), as compared to affirmations (e.g., good, smart), were used to describe a person's positive performance, recipients inferred (1) that the speaker had a more negative impression of the described person, (2) that the speaker had a more negative prior expectancy, (3) that the performance of the person was less likely caused by stable dispositional factors, and (4) that the person would be less likely to repeat this positive performance in the future. Conversely, when negations were used to describe negative performances (e.g., not good, not smart rather than bad, stupid), recipients inferred (1) that the speaker had a more positive impression of the described person, (2) had a more positive prior expectancy, and (3) that the person would be less likely to repeat this positive performance in the future.
The effects of negations on the inferences drawn were more pronounced for descriptions of positive than negative behavior. A possible reason for this observed asymmetry may be that people use negations to be polite, especially when describing a negative performance. That is, it is more polite to describe someone's stupid behavior as not smart than as stupid, because a negation mitigates the potentially face threatening information
The negation bias 35 (see . If negations (especially those on negative behavior) are indeed used to be polite, it is not surprising that these descriptions are perceived as less informative about a speaker's expectancies and the target's disposition, because the speaker may be hiding his or her true thoughts and feelings about a person.
Importantly, the inferences made by recipients on the basis of negation use contribute to the maintenance of stereotypes and expectancies at an interpersonal level. Speakers use relatively many negations to describe stereotype inconsistent behaviors (see Studies 1-3) and this use of negations, in the current study, leads recipients to make less dispositional attributions and stronger situational attributions on the basis of this information. In this way, stereotype inconsistent information remains unexpected and the stereotypical view is perpetuated, even despite the fact that a stereotype inconsistent behavior is being described.
General Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to explicitly illuminate the role of negations in the communication of stereotypic expectancies. Across four studies, we found consistent evidence for our prediction that the use of negations is a source of bias that reflects and transmits a speaker's prior assumptions and expectancies about other people. By doing so, this research is the first to apply knowledge about negations from pragmatics and psycholinguistics (De Villiers & Flusberg, 1975; Jordan, 1998; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; Wason, 1965) to the area of linguistic biases and stereotype maintenance (Franco & Maass, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007 Furthermore, we demonstrated that systematic variations in the use of negations have important communicative consequences. Study 4 showed that when negations (e.g., not stupid) rather than affirmations (e.g., smart) are used to describe behavior, recipients draw biased inferences about the speaker and the target. They infer that the speaker mitigates the valence of the performance, that the speaker had a different prior expectancy, and moreover, that the behavior was likely caused by situational circumstances rather than the actor's dispositions. Again, these findings extend our knowledge on linguistic biases (Douglas & Sutton, 2006; Maass et al., 1989; Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003; Wigboldus et al., 2000) . To illustrate, when a clever comment from a person belonging to a negatively stereotyped category is described with a negation (e.g., Harry's comment was not stupid), this conveys a
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Our observation that negations result in inferences that are different from affirmations is in line with previous work on the processing of negated concepts. Giora and colleagues (Giora, 2007; demonstrated that negated concepts are likely to remain accessible rather than being suppressed. Thereby the use of negations may ironically reinforce concepts and meanings in a recipient that the speaker describes as being not true. By extending these findings to person descriptions, our research suggests that when a speaker uses a negation, like He was not stupid, the speaker introduces the concept stupid to the discourse. Ironically, this activates associations that are opposite to the described person's actual positive behavior. The fact that stereotypic expectancies are an important antecedent of the production of negations in person description highlights the significance of such inferences. Both for the speaker and the recipients, the implicit inferences and associations sustain stereotypic expectancies. In this way, through the use of negations a speaker's stereotypic expectancy is implicitly transmitted, and consequently the stereotypic knowledge perpetuates interpersonally. These findings clarify, and are consistent with, research showing that stereotypes are difficult to disconfirm (Biernat & Ma, 2005; Rothbart & Park, 1986) .
In addition to the immediate inferences that negation descriptions induce, negations also appear to have a long term effect on how the communicated information is memorized.
Research has demonstrated that messages phrased with negations (e.g., John is not guilty) are represented differently in memory compared to messages phrased as affirmations (e.g., John is innocent). Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) argue that these differences can be explained by what they call a schema plus tag model. According to this model, a negated message is
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Especially when there is no readily accessible semantic opposite available during encoding, a sentence like John is not guilty is first interpreted within a message incongruent schema (e.g., guilt concept) before the negation marker is attached. This can lead to a dissociation of the negation marker and the negated concept at a later time. As a result, recipients may remember the opposite of the intended meaning (i.e., John is guilty) when they have in fact heard that John was not guilty. This effect would not occur when the same message is phrased as an affirmation (e.g., John is innocent). These findings suggest that thinking about something that was not true can lead to a false memory that it was true (see also Fiedler, Walther, Armbruster, Fay, & Naumann, 1996) . Translated to the negation bias, this means that when stereotype disconfirming information is communicated with negations, it may end up in memory as stereotype confirming.
In a similar vein, people's judgments are influenced by messages they are told are not true. For example, research on incriminating innuendo delivered by media sources (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, & Beattie, 1981) shows that when people read a newspaper headline such as Bob Talbert is not linked with mafia, they develop more unfavorable impressions of Bob Talbert compared to control headlines (e.g., Bob Talbert arrives in city). This suggests that negations are a type of innuendo that introduces a presupposition about the target.
Presumably, recipients infer that the introduced information (i.e., linked to mafia) must be relevant and plausible. After all, why should one deny something unless this was in fact a possibility? The denial of criminality then (e.g., P is not a criminal) may itself prove incriminating (Wegner, et al., 1981; Wegner, Coulton & Wenzlaff, 1985 ; for related evidence see Christie et al. 2001; Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; Grant, Malaviya, Sternthal, 2004; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, Ludtke & Zwaan, 2006; Paradis &Willners, 2006 ). These findings demonstrate the consequences of using
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The current results are not only consistent with previous findings, they also extend them in an important way. Our work demonstrates that negation descriptions result from the prior stereotypic expectancies of a speaker, and induce inferences about unexpectedness of the described behavior. In other words, stereotypic expectancies elicit the use of negation descriptions, and these negation descriptions in turn induce stereotypic inferences in recipients. Research on how people establish common ground suggests that this use of negations is highly functional. People are more likely to talk about stereotypes and cultural knowledge that they think they share with other people even when counter-stereotypical information is available (Clark & Kashima, 2007; Fast, Heath, & Wu, 2009 ). This preference for the communication of stereotypes helps people to maintain and facilitate relationships and to feel socially connected (Clark & Kashima, 2007) , and it facilitates the distribution of information about cultural phenomena (Fast et al., 2009 ). As such, negations are an important functional linguistic mean by which stereotypes are interpersonally shared and maintained (Clark & Kashima, 2007; Fast et al., 2009; Maas, 1999) . At the same time, however, a biased use of negations may contribute to the distribution of negative and harmful stereotypes that promote prejudice and discrimination. Based on the current findings, we advise people that want to, or professionally have to avoid biased language use, simply to refrain from using negations when describing the behavior of others. This simple precaution may, at least to some extent, prevent the unwanted transmission of stereotypes.
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The man attending the funeral (2) laughed loudly (1) a he is not sad he is happy cried loudly (2) b he is not happy he is sad b The professor (1) The garbage man (2) scored high on the IQ test (1) a he is not stupid he is smart scored low on the IQ test (2) b he is not smart he is stupid c The soccer hooligan (1) The nurse (2) shouts at the waiter ( 1-1 and 2-2, the stereotype inconsistent trials consist of: 1-2 and 2-1.
a valence of behavior is positive.
b valence of behavior is negative
